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 Abstract 
Although biologists and philosophers of science generally agree that genes cannot 
determine the forms of biological and psychological traits, students, journalists, 
politicians, and other members of the general public nonetheless continue to embrace 
genetic determinism. This paper identifies some of the concerns typically raised by 
individuals when they first encounter the systems perspective that biologists and 
philosophers of science now favor over genetic determinism, and uses arguments informed 
by that perspective to address those concerns. No definitive statements can yet be made 
about why genetic determinism has proven so resilient in the face of empirical evidence 
pointing up its deficiencies, but conveying the essential interdependence of “nature” and 
“nurture” to the general public will likely require deployment of the arguments that 
systems theorists ordinarily use to reject genetic determinism. In addition, the elaboration 
of new metaphors that focus attention on the dynamic nature of trait construction will likely 
prove valuable, because re-conceptualizing notions like “genes” and “nature” will 
probably be one of the most effective ways to help students and the general public abandon 
the genetic determinism that biologists now recognize as indefensible. 
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Espousing interactions and fielding reactions:  
Addressing laypeople’s beliefs about genetic determinism 
 Genetic determinism, in all of its various forms, has proven remarkably resilient in 
the face of both theoretical and empirical work showing it to be a poor way of explaining 
how biological and psychological characteristics emerge during development. It appears 
that merely comprehending what genes actually do does not necessarily lead to a rejection 
of genetic determinism, because in spite of evidence to the contrary, even some biologists 
continue to write as if developmental processes can be genetically determined (e.g., 
Gehring, 1998). There are likely several factors that contribute to most people’s strongly 
held convictions that genes can deterministically produce at least some of our 
characteristics; this paper will offer a non-comprehensive inventory of the concerns often 
raised by individuals when they first encounter the systems perspective championed by 
many philosophers of science (Griffiths & Gray, 2001; Moss, 2003; Robert, 2006; Stotz, 
2006) and now ascendant in biology (Gilbert, 2001; Jablonka & Lamb, 2005; Lewontin, 
2000; Nijhout, 2003).  
Systems theorists advocate a probabilistic view of trait development that holds that 
all of our biological and psychological characteristics are co-constructed during 
development by genetic and environmental factors operating in collaboration with one 
another; this approach rejects the possibility that either type of factor is more agentive or 
provides developmental information that is more causally important than the other. In this 
paper, after identifying particular questions often asked by those encountering the systems 
perspective for the first time, arguments informed by the systems viewpoint will be 
deployed to address these concerns. Those psychologists, laypeople, and biologists who 
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embrace genetic determinism probably each have different reasons for doing so, but similar 
sorts of explanations are likely to be required when trying to disabuse these various 
populations of their deterministic ideas; nonetheless, the discussion below is intended to be 
particularly useful for psychologists. 
The idea that genetic factors might be able to determine the form of biological and 
psychological traits has been with us since the beginning of modern theorizing about genes. 
Although Gregor Mendel did not use the word genes to name the “heritable factors” that he 
inferred must be responsible for observed variations in his experimental pea plants, the 
notion of a deterministic “germ plasm” had appeared in several late 19th century writings 
on biology—most notably in the work of August Weismann—and because of the close 
conceptual similarity between Mendel’s “heritable factors” and Weismann’s deterministic 
“germ plasm,” it is little wonder that just a few decades later, Mendel’s factors came to be 
thought of as deterministic “genes.” T. H. Morgan’s early 20th century discovery that genes 
are located on chromosomes eventually led to the development of the modern gene theory, 
which holds that genes are responsible for the development of inherited traits; this conclusion 
was based on the finding that the presence of particular genetic factors is highly correlated 
with the presence of particular traits. But even though such correlations do not support the 
contention that genes operate deterministically, modern gene theory nonetheless retained the 
genetic determinism that 19th century “germ plasm” theorists relied on to explain the 
intergenerational transmission of evolutionarily adaptive characteristics. This sort of 
conceptualization continued to inform theoretical biology well past the middle of the 20th 
century, as biologists embraced François Jacob and Jacques Monod’s operon model of how 
genes regulate development (Keller, 2000). 
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 Deterministic theories in psychology, likewise, have a long history. Psychology was 
informed by theories of biology at its inception (Sulloway, 1992), but the popularity of the 
belief that evolutionary mechanisms—operating proximally through deterministic genes—
can produce behaviors grew significantly with the publication of the works of Konrad 
Lorenz (e.g., Lorenz, 1965) and E. O. Wilson (e.g., Wilson, 1978) shortly after the middle 
of the last century. As there were in biology (Driesch, 1908, cited in Gottlieb, 1992; 
Sturtevant, 1915, cited in Carlson, 1966), there were behavioral scientists who understood 
from very early on that genetic-deterministic theories would ultimately fail to explain the 
origins of our psychological traits (Kuo, 1976; Lehrman, 1953; Schneirla, 1966); 
nonetheless, psychological theories rooted in the deterministic ideas of 19th century biology 
continue to be fashionable in branches of contemporary psychology such as evolutionary 
psychology and quantitative behavior genetics. The recent popularity of nativism in 
theories of language acquisition (Chomsky, 1975; Pinker, 1994, 2002), social cognition 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995; Cosmides, 1989), cognitive development (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007), 
and other domains illustrates how widely accepted deterministic accounts of psychological 
phenomena remain. 
In spite of the ongoing popularity of these ideas in psychology, recent decades have 
seen the publication of overwhelming empirical support for the idea that genetic factors 
cannot deterministically cause either biological or psychological/behavioral characteristics 
(Stotz, 2006); this view has now become relatively mainstream among philosophers of 
biology. Contributing to the widespread acceptance of this idea have been data collected in 
several disparate fields, including developmental psychobiology, the neurosciences, 
embryology, and molecular biology. Neuroscientists, for example, have discovered that 
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brain structure is more dependent on experience than was previously thought (Cohen et al., 
1997; Greenough, Black, & Wallace, 1987; Pantev et al., 1998). Molecular biologists have 
determined that a gene can be spliced in several alternative ways as a function of the (non-
genetic) cellular contexts in which the product of that gene will be constructed (Smith, 
Patton, & Nadal-Ginard, 1989). Embryologists have found that basic information about 
which pole of a developing organism will develop into the head and which will develop 
into the tail can be extracted from chemical gradients present in the cytoplasm—not in the 
genes—of the developing zygote (Gilbert, 2006; Wolpert, 1992). And developmental 
psychobiologists have learned that experiences early in development can have epigenetic—
and inheritable—effects wherein particular genes in a newborn animal can be turned “on” 
or “off” as a function of the behavior of the animal’s mother (Harper, 2005; Meaney, 2007; 
Meaney & Szyf, 2005; Weaver et al., 2007). Consequently, it is extremely rare at this point 
to find a scientist willing to publicly endorse genetic determinism, because it is no longer 
tenable to argue that some genes can single-handedly cause the development of specific 
traits independently of the contexts in which development takes place. 
 Nevertheless, the now-discredited belief that genes can determine the form of some 
of our characteristics remains widely held by journalists, politicians, students, and the 
general public—and surprisingly, by many social scientists. This idea probably owes its 
tenacity to different things in different people.  For some, its persistence probably reflects 
no more than straightforward ignorance of the significant facts. For others, genetic 
determinism might retain some currency because of the apparent elegance of its simplicity; 
the emerging understanding of how genes interact with non-genetic factors during 
development is extremely complex, and so perhaps less appealing to these individuals. Yet 
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other people might find it difficult to overcome a lesson learned at a young age, particularly 
when a deep appreciation of how traits really do develop is best obtained with exposure to 
empirical data from many diverse fields, including embryology, developmental 
psychobiology, the neurosciences, and developmental psychology (to name just a few). In 
the absence of relevant data, we cannot know how important each of these reasons is for 
different people, but anecdotally, it is clear that scientists trying to explain these ideas to 
their students often find them quite unwilling to believe that our biological and 
psychological characteristics always develop from the interactions of genetic and non-
genetic factors.  
To understand why genetic determinism is so tenacious, it will be helpful to 
consider some of the questions that naïve—but nonetheless resistant—audiences typically 
ask when first exposed to the essential facts of gene-environment interdependence. The 
following sections will each consider a question that such audiences commonly raise when 
encountering a systems viewpoint for the first time. While the questions themselves will 
serve to illuminate some of the major obstacles that hinder understanding of the 
fundamental interdependence of genetic and non-genetic factors during development, a 
presentation of the arguments that systems theorists ordinarily use to address these 
questions will aid those attempting to help students relinquish strongly held ideas about 
genetic determinism.  
Several Questions Naive Audiences Typically Raise When Confronted With 
Gene-Environment Interactionism 
If I look like my parents regardless of the environment in which I grew up, my 
appearance must have been determined by my genes, right? 
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 One reason often given by those convinced that some traits must be genetically 
determined is the physical similarity of offspring to their parents. This objection to gene-
environment interactionism typically involves references to the fact that children often 
resemble their biological parents even if they are raised by adoptive parents. As this 
argument is usually advanced, the physical characteristics of an adopted child who 
resembles her biological parents must be genetically determined, because the biological 
parents are thought to have contributed nothing to the child other than her genes. However, 
biologists now understand that parents provide several types of non-genetic “information” 
to their offspring prior to birth (and certainly prior to adoption), some of which play 
important roles in the development of the offspring’s characteristics (Harper, 2005; 
Jablonka & Lamb, 2005). Examples of these types of “information” include the patterns-of-
distribution of chemical factors in the ovum’s cytoplasm, methylation patterns that affect 
the functioning of the DNA in the ovum and the sperm, and the specific chemical 
environment of the uterus (in which the characteristics of offspring first begin to develop), 
among others.  
A common objection to this observation is that these types of “information” do not, 
in most cases, account for the physical differences that give individual offspring their 
unique appearances; normal development usually entails very little cross-individual 
variability in either zygotes’ internal structures or in the characteristics of their prenatal 
environments. Some evidence suggests that differences in such factors can account for 
behavioral differences between individuals (Meaney & Szyf, 2005; Weaver et al., 2007), 
but these data, while exceedingly important, ought not distract from the following general 
point: developmental factors that never vary—for example, the presence of oxygen or 
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gravity in human developmental environments—while often ignored when people consider 
the origins of traits, are ignored in error. 
For example, human developmental environments are always characterized by 
linguistic input that influences normal language development.  The fact that such input is 
invariably present does not reduce the importance of this input in the development of 
linguistic competence. Of course, it remains the case that developmental factors that affect 
all individuals cannot account for the differences among those individuals; but just because 
a particular factor might not explain why you and I have different physical appearances 
does not mean that that factor did not contribute importantly to the development of your (or 
my) physical appearance. 
The importance of this point is so often lost on those who have never before 
considered these issues that some additional comment on it is warranted. At times, the 
argument is made that if a particular causal factor is always constant in a particular context, 
it can be safely ignored when assigning causation; although the presence of oxygen in a 
building is a necessary background condition for the building to burn, it is far more 
common to assign causal power in such a scenario to the arsonist striking a match than to 
the presence of the oxygen in the vicinity of the flame. This is because the presence of 
oxygen is usually assumed, because it is so invariable. This line of argument is not 
unreasonable; perhaps when a researcher refers to “the gene for trait X,” she means to 
say—and is typically understood to be saying—that the gene in question causes trait X 
assuming a particular (normal) developmental environment. But such a position effectively 
encourages us not to study the developmental mechanisms by which genes interact with 
other factors to produce the trait in question.  And in so doing, we are more likely to miss 
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possible routes by which the development of the trait could be influenced, possibly with 
beneficial consequences.  
For example, although most members of the medical community consider 
phenylketonuria (PKU) to be a genetic disorder (Cole, Cole, & Lightfoot, 2004)—because 
those with PKU have genetic constitutions that differ slightly from the rest of us—the fact 
remains that the disorder can be effectively treated with an environmental manipulation. If 
newborns at risk for PKU are fed a diet free of phenylalanine (an amino acid normally 
present in all human diets) the symptoms of PKU can be virtually eliminated. In this case, 
an understanding of the developmental mechanics that produce the symptoms of PKU gave 
rise to a subsequently confirmed hypothesis about how to effectively treat the disorder by 
manipulating an environmental factor that is relatively constant in normal human 
developmental environments. Such are the benefits of remaining aware of the effects of 
such “invariable” developmental factors on the emergence of our characteristics. If the 
goals of the behavioral and social sciences are pragmatic to the slightest degree, the causal 
roles of invariable “background” factors in the development of our traits simply must not 
be ignored. 
Of course, it should go without saying that an awareness of non-genetic 
contributions to development ought not blind us to the important roles genetic factors play 
in development; however, an explicit statement of this fact is necessary, because those 
offering explanations of development informed by systems theories are sometimes 
erroneously seen as denying the importance of genetic factors in development, simply 
because they insist on the importance of non-genetic factors as contributors to this process. 
If we want to know why two unrelated children raised by the same adoptive parents will 
Interactions and Reactions 11 
typically resemble their own biological parents, we need merely point out that genetic 
factors obviously do contribute in essential ways to the development of our characteristics. 
But developmental outcomes are not pre-determined by such contributions; non-genetic 
factors contribute to these outcomes in ways that are just as essential, even if it is difficult 
for us to see their effects when such factors are unvarying. Although the proverbial fish that 
has spent her entire life in the sea does not know that she lives in a watery environment 
(because she has never experienced anything else), it nonetheless remains the case that fish 
are as they are at least in part because of the peculiar qualities of water. 
If my brother is outgoing and I’m shy even though our parents treated us the same way, 
our personalities must have been determined by our genes, right? 
 Genetic-deterministic explanations for our characteristics seem to be readily 
accepted in some cases because of erroneous folk-beliefs regarding the environmental 
factors that contribute to those characteristics. If a “folk theory” of personality holds that 
easily observable parental behaviors are the important non-genetic contributors to 
personality development, the subsequent discovery that there are no differences in such 
behaviors across parents might lead one to conclude that the important contributors to 
personality development are genetic.  Of course, this is a fundamental error: in fact, other 
non-genetic contributors to personality development might be the important ones, and we 
cannot know in advance of developmental analysis if they are or are not.  Time and again, 
developmental analyses have revealed that among the important influences on the 
development of particular characteristics are some that are, in the nomenclature of Gilbert 
Gottlieb (1991a), nonobvious; such contributing influences are factors that would not have 
been thought important prior to developmental analysis. The discovery that some of the 
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non-genetic contributors to development are nonobvious means that until we understand 
exactly what factors are involved in the development of a particular characteristic—and to 
date, there are virtually no psychological characteristics that develop in ways that are so 
well understood—we cannot effectively evaluate the extent to which two developmental 
environments are similar. Although it might seem as if the environment in which I 
developed is identical to the environment in which my brother developed, we cannot know 
if our environments were identical with regards to the factors that really matter, if we do 
not know in advance which factors actually are the ones that matter. The bottom line is that 
no two bodies can be raised in identical environments—even monozygotic twin fetuses in a 
single uterus are in slightly different positions relative to one another, and one of them will 
be born prior to the other—so the intuitions resulting from a casual observation that two 
individuals were reared in similar environments ought always be considered suspect.2 
Haven’t controlled studies of twins-reared-apart proven that genes can cause traits? 
In the process of simplifying scientific reports so that they will be comprehensible 
to the general public, the popular press has contributed in significant ways to the 
widespread notion that genes can deterministically cause some of our traits. But the 
primary source of data that has contributed to this discredited notion has been the field of 
quantitative behavior genetics, which has drawn its most compelling conclusions from 
studies of fraternal and so-called “identical” twins who have been adopted into “different” 
                                                
2 Strong evidence that no two bodies ever develop identically—even if they are reared in identical 
environments—has been generated in studies of a relatively simple type of worm, the nematode 
Caenorhabditis elegans. Such studies have determined that genetically identical worms reared in identical 
environments can nonetheless develop different behavioral characteristics. As Gilbert & Jorgensen note, 
“organisms with the same inheritance…and the same environment…still [wind up with] behavioral differences as 
a result of chance events during development” (1998, p. 263). If differences like these can characterize such 
relatively simple animals reared under such controlled conditions, we ought to be very suspicious indeed of our 
intuitions that differences between human individuals reared in “the same environment” must have been caused 
by differences in their genes. 
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environments. These sorts of studies have been the subject of several extensive critiques 
(Joseph, 2001, 2006; Lewontin, Rose, & Kamin, 1984), many of which have been 
decidedly negative. These cogent critiques need not be recited here, given their 
accessibility elsewhere. Rather, for the purposes of the present paper, it is enough to note 
that the design of quantitative behavior genetics studies, by its very nature, is unable to 
demonstrate genetic determinism, even in those cases in which the general public is most 
convinced of its existence (e.g., in the case of eye color).  This inability reflects the fact that 
such studies are always correlational, so the data they generate can at best reveal that 
variation in a particular factor (say, the presence or absence of a particular gene) is 
associated with variation in another factor (say, the presence or absence of a particular 
phenotypic characteristic).  Of course, as all first year graduate students in the social 
sciences are aware, co-variation need never indicate that two factors are causally related; 
consequently, it is, frankly, far-fetched to think that these studies could even lend support 
to the hypothesis that particular genes determine the development of particular traits. In 
fact, quantitative behavior geneticists have conceded that their studies cannot be used to 
support claims of genetic determinism; as one leading evolutionary psychologist put it, no 
“sane biologist would ever dream of proposing” that human behavior is genetically 
determined (Pinker, 2002, p. 112). Nonetheless, when the results of studies of quantitative 
behavior genetics are passed on to journalists, textbook writers, students, and the general 
public, they are often misinterpreted in ways that perpetuate the idea that some of our 
characteristics can be genetically determined.3 
                                                
3 To give just one of many possible examples, The New York Times reported in a 2005 article that “some 
researchers believe there is likely to be a genetic component of homosexuality because of its concordance 
among twins.” Although studies of twins are not able to produce valid conclusions about the extent to which 
genetic factors contribute to the development of particular characteristics (Moore, 2001, 2006), such studies 
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 Part of the trouble with the data collected by quantitative behavior geneticists is that 
they are typically used to compute heritability statistics, extraordinarily misunderstood 
statistics that, despite their misleading name, do not reflect how inheritable various 
characteristics are (Block, 1995; Moore, 2001). Heritability statistics can only account for 
variation in characteristics across populations; they cannot explain the development of 
characteristics in individuals, and they do not measure the likelihood that a parental 
characteristic will also be present (i.e., develop) in descendant generations. Under certain 
controlled circumstances (e.g., animal husbandry projects), heritability statistics have 
proven useful, in large part because when developmental environments are strictly 
controlled—as they are whenever heritability statistics have any practical value—variations 
in developmental outcomes can be accounted for only by those factors that remain free to 
vary (i.e., genetic factors alone).4  However, heritability statistics have never been shown to 
have any predictive utility at all when applied to human beings and their offspring; this 
should not be surprising given what we now understand about how environmental factors 
influence developmental outcomes. 
One reason heritability statistics computed for human populations have proven 
useless is that they cannot be appropriately generalized beyond the study population that 
generated the statistics in the first place. Generalizing the results of a heritability study 
                                                                                                                                               
were presented to the public in this article in the context of a sentence that began “If sexual orientation has a 
genetic cause…,” as if it might actually be possible for genetic factors to determine sexual orientation. 
4 Of course, the converse is true as well: when genetic variation in a population is virtually absent, variations 
in developmental outcomes can be accounted for only by environmental factors. This feature of heritability 
has given rise to some heritability estimates that strike most people as remarkably counterintuitive. For 
example, although no one would question the importance of the role that genetic factors play in the 
development of 5-fingered hands in human beings, the heritability of this characteristic is nonetheless 
extremely low (Block, 1995). This result reflects that fact that variations in finger numbers across human 
populations are better accounted for by variations in the frequencies of industrial accidents than by variations 
in the frequencies of particular genes (because there is very little variation across human populations in the 
frequencies of genes that contribute to the numbers of fingers on our hands). 
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from a population of research participants to a much broader population requires 
confidence that the variation in developmental environments experienced by the broader 
population is no different than the variation in developmental environments experienced by 
the research participants. But, because we typically do not know which factors play 
important roles in the development of a particular characteristic (as discussed above), it is 
not possible to know if the variation in those factors is the same across the broader 
population as it was in the original population of research participants; the variation in 
developmental environments experienced by the research participants could be greater 
than, equal to, or less than the variation experienced by the broader population (Moore, 
2006).  Consequently, heritability statistics do not provide us with a useful measure of the 
extent to which a characteristic is influenced by genetic factors independently of 
environmental factors, our intuitions about it notwithstanding. 
I learned in school that eye color is genetically determined; how can that satisfying and 
predictively useful explanation be wrong? 
One of the most widely disseminated insights in biology has been Gregor Mendel’s 
interpretation of his pea-plant studies, brought to bear as an explanation of human eye 
color.  Virtually any student with even a minimum of exposure to biology learned at some 
point in school that human beings have two alleles for eye color, the dominant brown allele 
typically being represented by a “big B” and the recessive blue allele typically being 
represented by a “little b;” this lesson has no doubt helped countless schoolchildren 
understand how a blue-eyed child might be born to two brown-eyed parents.  This example 
has the obvious virtue of explaining people’s readily observed experiential data (i.e., their 
anecdotes) in a way that feels intuitively reasonable to them. 
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 Unfortunately, although the Mendelian explanation of the intergenerational 
transmission of eye color is readily comprehensible and appears to have predictive utility, it 
remains the case that it is a misleading simplification of the actual developmental processes 
that give rise to eye colors.  As early as 1915, Sturtevant wrote:  
Although there is little that we can say as to the nature of Mendelian 
genes, we do know that they are not ‘determinants’…The difference 
between normal red eyes and colorless (white) ones in Drosophila [fruit 
flies] is due to a difference in a single gene. Yet red is a very complex 
color, requiring the interaction of at least five (and probably of very many 
more) different genes for its production…we can then, in no sense identify 
a given gene with the red color of the eye, even though there is a single 
gene differentiating it from the colorless eye…all that we mean when we 
speak of a gene for pink eyes is, a gene which differentiates a pink eyed 
fly from a normal one—not a gene which produces pink eyes per se…” 
(Carlson, 1966, p. 69). 
Thus, the explanation proffered for eye color in schools around the world has never been 
one that biologists have meant to be understood as genetic-deterministic. Rather, the 
Mendelian explanation continues to be taught in schools because it has predictive utility, 
owing to the fact that many of the genetic and non-genetic factors that contribute to eye 
color during development are relatively constant from individual to individual.5 As noted 
                                                
5 It is worth noting here that it is not merely a happy coincidence that the non-genetic factors required for the 
development of some of our characteristics are so common in our developmental environments. 
Developmental environments are typically reproduced in each generation, ensuring that the presence of these 
non-genetic factors is relatively stable across generations. Griffiths and Gray (1994) have identified several 
types of “developmental resources” that are reliably reproduced in the developmental environments of 
successive generations, including (among others) parental, population-generated, and persistent resources. For 
example, the homes that parents build prior to the birth of their offspring impose important structure on the 
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above, a factor that does not vary during normal development might appear to make no 
contribution to development, simply because the factor does not contribute to observable 
differences in developmental outcomes. But just because a factor does not contribute to 
differences in an outcome does not mean that it does not contribute to the development of 
the outcome per se.  
But don’t some traits develop without any experiential input at all? And aren’t some 
traits impervious to any such influences? 
The idea that genes can deterministically cause some of our traits is attractive in 
part because we have all noticed that some of our characteristics appear to develop without 
any experiential input. We often consider characteristics to have been “nurtured” if they 
have been learned, that is, if there are obvious experiences that an individual is required to 
have had in order to develop the characteristic. In contrast, some of our characteristics—for 
example, our basic body plans (i.e., two arms and two legs, etc.) or our secondary sexual 
characteristics (e.g., my facial hair)—do not appear to require any particular sort of 
experience for their development.  Likewise, some traits seem impervious to environmental 
influence because they develop in all normal members of a species, seemingly 
independently of the environments in which those individuals are reared.  In both cases, 
                                                                                                                                               
offspring’s developmental environments; while enhancing an offspring’s survival prospects, such parental 
resources also ensure that offspring are exposed to a limited portion of the stimulation the world has to offer, 
a portion that is, in the words of Lickliter and Berry (1990) “structured, organized, and specific to the 
organism.” Likewise, cultural artifacts (e.g., spoken language in human beings) are present in the 
developmental environments of successive generations of organisms, and resources such as these, generated 
not by particular parents but by a population of ancestors, can structure the environment in ways that 
contribute importantly to the development of adaptive characteristics in individuals. Finally, environmental 
factors that are not actively produced by organisms at all but that are—by virtue of where a particular species 
reproduces—persistently present in those organisms’ developmental environments can also provide 
successive generations with stable non-genetic information that contributes to the development of species-
typical characteristics. For example, the National Academy of Sciences (1999) reports that “the larvae of the 
fly Drosophila carcinophila can develop only in specialized grooves beneath the flaps of the third pair of oral 
appendages of a land crab that is found only on certain Caribbean islands;” clearly, extremely specific 
developmental environments can, in effect, be passed from generation to generation in a way that ensures the 
stable transmission-across-generations of non-genetic developmental information. 
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however, what appears to be the case at first glance turns out not to be the case once we 
have studied the developmental mechanics that actually give rise to the traits in question. 
 To choose just two of many possible examples, Müller (2003) has written about the 
importance of experiencing particular mechanical forces during embryonic development in 
order to develop normal skeletal structures, and the work of Kaas (1991) and Merzenich 
(1998) with non-human primates and human beings has highlighted the important roles that 
normal sensory and motor experiences play in the development of the sensory and motor 
maps that characterize all normal human brains. In such cases, the experiences required for 
the development of these characteristics are nonobvious, perhaps because all normally 
developing individuals encounter the requisite experiential stimuli. If we define 
“experience” very narrowly as “learning,” it is true that some of our characteristics do not 
require experience for their development.  But such a definition is unnecessarily narrow, 
because there are many non-genetic factors that make essential contributions to 
development, and many of these would be considered “environmental” by anyone’s 
definition of that word (e.g., nutrition). If we define “experience” more broadly as exposure 
to any non-genetic stimulus that can influence development, we can safely say that there 
are no traits that are impervious to experiential input. 
 As we have learned more about the biological mechanisms underlying the 
development of the structural and behavioral features of animals, it has become clear that 
just as genetic factors can only influence development by affecting cellular processes 
“above” the level of the genes, all experiences must have their effects by influencing events 
in the body’s cells, whether those experiences entail learning or not. Experiential factors 
are now known to influence gene expression through several mechanisms, including (but 
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not limited to) those involving the actions of steroid hormones and those involving the 
actions of a class of genes known as immediate-early genes (IEGs).  For example, 
testosterone levels change as a function of sexual experience, and hormones like 
testosterone are known to be able to diffuse across both cellular and nuclear membranes 
where—once they have been bound by specific receptors—they can bind with DNA to 
regulate gene expression (Yamamoto, 1985). In contrast, IEGs can be influenced even 
more directly by experience; IEGs located in the nuclei of neurons begin to be expressed 
only when specific experiences produce neural activity in those cells (Michel & Moore, 
1995). As these examples make clear, experiences can influence development in many 
ways other than simply via “learning,” as it has traditionally been understood. 
Although for many of our characteristics, we have not yet discovered which 
experiential inputs influence their development, persistent investigators have repeatedly 
found that characteristics previously thought impervious to experiential input are, in fact, 
influenced by an organism’s experiences during development. In a classic demonstration of 
this phenomenon, Gottlieb (1981) demonstrated that mallard ducklings’ natural tendency to 
move toward the source of the mallard maternal call—a tendency that had previously been 
described both as innate, and uninfluenced by experience—can be affected by particular 
sensory experiences; in fact, Gottlieb (1991b) was able to get mallard ducklings to move 
toward the source of a chicken’s call (a stimulus that normal mallard ducklings would not 
approach), simply by exposing them to particular auditory stimuli at the right time during 
embryonic development.  Likewise, West and King have shown that a behavioral 
characteristic of male cowbirds previously thought to emerge from a species-specific innate 
template—namely the songs they sing during courtship rituals—is, in fact, importantly 
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affected by the males’ experiences. Specifically, female cowbirds influence the structure of 
developing male cowbirds’ songs by responding to segments of their immature, variable 
vocalizations with a very specific, non-vocal, social behavior that ultimately shapes the 
songs into the stereotyped, potent form that is typical of mature males (West & King, 1988; 
King, West, Goldstein, 2005). Given the number of characteristics that were once thought 
to develop in a way that is impervious to experiential input, but that have since been shown 
after extensive developmental analysis to be affected by such input, it is now the emerging 
consensus of developmental scientists that there are no traits whose development is 
impervious to experiential influence.  
Doesn’t the theory of evolution require adaptive characteristics to be transmitted across 
generations by the genes? Aren’t species-typical, adaptive traits—those that develop in 
all normal members of a species—necessarily caused by genes alone? 
Biologists’ received view of evolution is known as the Modern Synthesis; this 
theory was produced by a collection of biologists writing in the first half of the 20th 
century, and was a remarkably successful fusion of Darwin’s ideas about evolution and the 
theory of the gene that emerged following the scientific community’s rediscovery in 1900 
of Mendel’s seminal work on heredity. In order to produce a comprehensive theory that 
actually worked, the architects of the Modern Synthesis felt compelled to exclude 
developmental processes from their theory, despite the fact that many of them—
Theodosius Dobzhansky, Julian Huxley, and Sewall Wright, for example—recognized the 
central role that such processes rightly should play in a comprehensive theory of biology. 
One consequence of this decision was the subsequent definition of evolution in terms of 
changing gene frequencies across generations; the Modern Synthesis is a theory about 
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genes and their role in evolution (Jablonka & Lamb, 1995). However, as more recent data 
have discredited the notion that genetic factors can deterministically cause traits (adaptive 
or otherwise), the Modern Synthesis has become an increasingly unsatisfactory theory of 
biology.6 
 Although consensus has not yet been reached on how the Modern Synthesis should 
be altered, it is clear that any theory that requires characteristics to be transmitted across 
generations via exclusively genetic mechanisms will ultimately fail, because genetic 
mechanisms alone are not capable of doing the work that such theories require of them. 
Therefore, one of the several revisions to the Modern Synthesis that must be implemented 
if it is to remain a viable theory of evolution would replace the strictly genetic transmission 
of adaptive traits with transmission mechanisms that provide both the genetic and non-
genetic resources that developing organisms require to build the traits that proved adaptive 
to their ancestors. Among the many theorists who have been trying to figure out how such 
mechanisms might operate are biologists (e.g., Jablonka & Lamb, 2005), philosophers of 
biology (e.g., Griffiths & Gray, 2001; Robert, 2006), and behavioral scientists (e.g., 
Lickliter & Berry, 1990; Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2003; West & King, 1987). These theorists 
acknowledge that nature has provided mechanisms by which organisms reliably develop 
adaptive characteristics during development; such species-typical, adaptive characteristics 
obviously play important roles in the evolutionary process.  But it has become clear that 
such characteristics need not be genetically determined, in part because each species has 
                                                
6 Scientists dissatisfied with the Modern Synthesis have identified a variety of problems with the theory, only 
one of which is its underlying assumptions regarding the genetic determination of adaptive characteristics. 
Some of the most trenchant critiques of the Modern Synthesis have emerged from Evolutionary 
Developmental Biology, the branch of biology sometimes known as ‘evo-devo’. For instance, evo-devo 
researchers have argued that the Modern Synthesis does a poor job of explaining how novel adaptive 
characteristics of animals emerge in the first place, a question that arguably should be at the center of any 
theory purporting to explain evolution.  However, given the focus of this paper on genetic determinism, a 
broader critique of the Modern Synthesis that considers such concerns is beyond the scope of this work. 
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evolved in a particular context—a developmental niche—and these contexts can now be 
expected to be reproduced during the development of descendant generations (Greenough, 
Black, & Wallace, 1987). Thus, evolutionarily adaptive traits can be developmentally 
stable and universally acquired by members of a species, but still not be specified in genes 
that deterministically dictate phenotypic outcomes prior to the actual unfolding of 
development. In fact, it now appears that some genes require reliable developmental niches 
in order to be stably expressed across generations (K. Stotz, personal communication, 
January 28, 2008). 
Why is it so hard to convey to students and the general public the full extent to which 
nature and nurture are fundamentally interdependent on one another? 
Beyond the reasons alluded to above, there are likely additional reasons that 
students, journalists, and social scientists unfamiliar with the current facts of biology are 
skeptical when they first hear that genes cannot determine the forms of even relatively 
simple biological characteristics. But given the questions that usually arise when laypeople 
learn of the non-deterministic nature of genetic influence, it is clear that the major sources 
of this skepticism include 1) previous exposure to teachers who asserted that genes can 
determine some characteristics (however incorrect those assertions might have been), 2) 
exposure to mass media reports about studies (including twin and adoption studies) that, 
when simplified, seem to support claims of genetic determinism, and 3) personal 
observations of the development of characteristics that appear to be unaffected by 
experiences. In contrast, it seems unlikely that simple ignorance of the relevant facts of 
biology should be considered the primary source of skepticism in this case, because if it 
was, then one ought to be able to convince a skeptic that genes cannot independently 
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produce characteristics like hair color, alcoholism, height, or breast cancer by simply 
explaining what genetic factors do during development: that is, provide a portion of the 
information needed to sequence proteins. However, explaining that this is the one thing that 
genes actually can contribute to development generally does not lead immediately to 
acceptance of the idea that genes are unable to operate deterministically. 
The resistance typically encountered by a scientist trying to explain how these 
processes work might be no different than the resistance physicists probably meet when 
they inform naïve listeners of the fundamental equivalence of matter and energy; as in that 
case, convincing listeners that genes do not operate deterministically would be difficult if 
they are ignorant of background information required to evaluate the relevant data. 
Similarly, although students can be taught about the limits to the conclusions one can 
appropriately draw when interpreting the correlational data generated in human twin 
studies, a deep appreciation of how little such studies can actually tell us about genetic 
contributions to our traits is more difficult to obtain; even professional social scientists 
occasionally jump to inappropriate causal conclusions on the basis of correlational data.  
Two other features of this particular problem render it exceptionally difficult.  First, 
even though biologists now know that genetic factors always interact with other factors to 
produce our characteristics, in most cases we are still poorly informed about the specific 
developmental mechanisms that produce those characteristics.  Indeed, it is the very need to 
illuminate these developmental mechanisms that has motivated some of the more vocal 
critics of genetic determinism (Gottlieb, 1995; Lehrman, 1953; Lickliter & Honeycutt, 
2003). Until such mechanisms have been elucidated, however, it is difficult to convince 
students to give up a sense of understanding (however ill-founded it might be) in favor of a 
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more honest sense of ignorance; generally, students are discomfited by the very large gaps 
that still characterize scientific knowledge in this domain.  Second, just as Albert Einstein 
was troubled by quantum mechanics because of its probabilistic nature—he famously 
expressed this uneasiness in a 1926 letter to Max Born, writing “I…am convinced that He 
[God] does not throw dice”—it is not particularly surprising that students would prefer 
deterministic theories to probabilistic theories.  The fact that the developmental processes 
that give rise to our characteristics are fundamentally probabilistic (Gottlieb, 1998) renders 
them harder to understand for students more familiar with simple cause-effect 
relationships. 
Ultimately, genetic determinism likely owes much of its endurance to the fact that it 
is so simple. However, although many philosophers and scientists consider simpler theories 
to be preferable to more complex theories, all other things being equal (Sober, 1981), a 
truly complex reality requires a complex theory, even if such a theory might initially be 
less appealing to those exposed to it. Unfortunately, it is not yet clear how we might best 
attempt to convey the essential interdependence of nature and nurture to students and the 
general public. 
That having been said, some of the new concepts and metaphors introduced recently 
by theorists concerned with these issues (Moss, 2003; Stotz, 2006; Griffiths & Stotz, 2006) 
might be useful tools in this effort. Metaphors can powerfully influence how we think 
about complex phenomena; for example, if one thinks of a genome as analogous to a 
recipe, one is more likely to focus on matters of process than if one thinks of the genome as 
analogous to a blueprint. Many systems theorists remain as dissatisfied with ‘recipe’ 
metaphors for the genome as they were with ‘blueprint’ metaphors for the genome, but it is 
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clear from this example how the use of different metaphors can influence our 
conceptualizations. In addition to those theorists who have suggested new metaphors for re-
conceptualizing the genome, other theorists (e.g., Moore, 2001; Thelen & Smith, 1994) 
have proposed metaphors specifically designed to dispense with the outworn and 
obstructive dichotomies (e.g., nature vs. nurture, gene vs. environment, etc.) that we 
inherited from our intellectual ancestors at the end of the 19th century. In much the same 
way as a “recipe” metaphor for the genome draws attention to the processes driving 
development, these metaphors serve to focus attention on the fundamental interdependence 
of “nature” and “nurture,” an interdependence that runs so deep that the very distinction 
between the two ideas is rendered suspect. Perhaps re-conceptualizing notions like “genes” 
and “nature” will finally enable students and the general public to abandon the genetic 
determinism that biologists now recognize as indefensible. But regardless, effective 
education about these matters will no doubt improve as we come to understand why belief 
in genetic determinism has persisted so long in the face of evidence indicating that it is not 
a constructive way to think about the emergence of biological and psychological 
characteristics in development. 
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